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Economists, whose discipline has al-
ways had a strong relationship to moral
philosophy (Adam Smith, the author of
The Wealth of Nations, also wrote the cel-
ebrated Theory of Moral Sentiments), have
always seen their role in society as that
of pursuing the public good. They prop-
erly see themselves as guardians of the
public interest, and to be engaged in
public-policy debates against special in-
terests who wish to ‘capture’ policy to
advance their narrowly circumscribed,
self-serving agendas.
I must note at the outset that as one
analyzes the public debates on questions
of economic policy, one sees cynical at-
tempts by special interests to gain the
higher ground. One might observe wry-
ly that in the battle for public support,
one tries to gain the advantage by claim-
ing that the opponent’s interest is ‘spe-
cial’ and one’s own is ‘general.’ We have 
long known that special interests have
learned their Orwell well: they under-
stand that words matter in public de-
bates.
Thus, protectionists have typically
used the inviting phrase ‘fair trade’ to
mask their protectionism.1 This was 
true at the end of the nineteenth centu-
ry when Britain, the long-standing pro-
ponent of free trade, was facing the rise
of Germany and the United States. As
Britain experienced what I have called
‘diminished giant syndrome,’ ‘fair trade’
became a cry of the protectionists, who
charged these newly emerged and pro-
tectionist trading nations with ‘unfair
trade’ and condemned Britain’s free-
trade policy as inappropriate. The Unit-
ed States would confront the same syn-
drome a century later, with the dramatic
rise of Japan in the 1980s and the dread-
ed prospect that the twenty-½rst centu-
ry would be Japan’s as the twentieth 
was America’s and the nineteenth was
Britain’s. Exactly as in Britain at the end
Dædalus  Fall 2007 37
Jagdish Bhagwati
Economic policy in the public interest
Jagdish Bhagwati, a Fellow of the American
Academy since 1982, is University Professor, 
Economics and Law, at Columbia University 
and Senior Fellow in International Economics 
at the Council on Foreign Relations. He has pub-
lished more than three hundred articles and has
authored or edited over ½fty volumes. His publi-
cations include “The Economics of Underdevel-
oped Countries” (1966), “Protectionism” (1988),
“Free Trade Today” (2002), and “In Defense of
Globalization” (2004).
© 2007 by Jagdish Bhagwati
1  Throughout this essay, I draw on examples
from the theory of commercial policy where
my scholarly expertise is the greatest. Similar
examples can surely be drawn from other areas
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of the nineteenth century, the United
States witnessed the growth of demands
for ‘fair trade,’ and charges against Japan
that it was a wicked ‘unfair trader’ that
excluded imports and dumped its ex-
ports.
The latest proponents of such de-
mands are the afl-cio and the New
Democrats–and therefore the Old
Democrats who must fall in line. They
are concerned with competition from
the poor countries instead. Desperately
seeking ways to protect themselves from
such competition, they claim that these
poor nations are indulging in ‘unfair
trade’ because they have labor and do-
mestic environmental standards not
identical to those in the United States.
Raising these standards in the poor
countries, in the name of ‘fair trade,’ 
is nothing but a form of ‘export protec-
tionism’: it is aimed at raising the cost 
of production in these countries and
thereby moderating the competition
they pose. 
These lobbies are equally adept at dis-
guising this protectionist agenda by si-
multaneously asserting that their de-
mands to have the poor nations raise
their labor standards to U.S. levels are
inspired by empathy and altruism for 
the workers in the poor countries–a
claim that is belied by reading the cam-
paign speeches of the New Democrats,
who always speak instead of the unfair-
ness of losing jobs to rivals with lower
standards, i.e., import competition.
Moreover, these lobbies frequently
paint economists as venal fronts for ‘cor-
porate interests’ on issues such as free
trade. These lobbies forget John Stuart
Mill’s observation that no general inter-
est was ever advanced unless someone’s
special interest was advanced alongside
it. In a democratic society, where votes
matter, free-traders like myself realize
that free trade cannot be advanced by
ideas alone: it is not enough to have the
generals; one must also have the troops.
Also, if special interests, like corporate
interests, happen to see their pro½t in
what one proposes, that does not sub-
tract from the fact that the policy one is
advocating is prompted by the public in-
terest.
One lesson for the economists who
seek to influence public policy, however,
is to ensure that they do not open them-
selves to the charge that they have been
‘bought.’ In the 1980s and early 1990s,
the years of Japan-bashing in the United
States, I was almost alone in defending
Japan against exaggerated, hysterical at-
tacks by Detroit and other U.S. produc-
ers, and by the media and the politicians.
At the time, I was careful not to accept
any moneys for even a lecture or a con-
ference paper in Japan. When I went to a
conference associated with the Japanese
Ministry of International Trade and In-
dustry (organized by my good friend
Professor Ryutaro Komiya, whom I got
to know well when he was at Harvard
and I was at mit in 1956–1957), we were
all offered $2,000 for our papers. All the
Japan-bashers readily accepted the mon-
ey; I said I would write but not accept
the honorarium. So I was given an extra
lunch coupon! I used it to eat tempura in
the Okura Hotel. Later, I told my friends
that I had had $2,000 tempura in Tokyo.
The punch line, however, was that prices
in Tokyo were so high, and even more
outrageous in the big hotels, that I could
very well have had tempura for $2,000!
For much the same reason, I have re-
fused to consult with multinationals or
to sit on their boards of directors. I gen-
erally defend multinationals against
knee-jerk attacks from agitators who
view multinationals and their ‘pro½ts’
the way moneylenders and ‘usury’ were
regarded in the Middle Ages. Undeni-
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many economists do today has enabled
me to be more credible when I defend
corporations against unjusti½ed assaults. 
Let me add that corporations are often
buying an economist’s reputation, not
his or her analytical judgments. Their
game often is simply to say, at a suitable
price, that Professor Jagdish Bhagwati 
or Professor Paul Krugman or Profes-
sor William Baumol is on our side. We
would be wise not to yield to such bland-
ishments. We may give our advice anon-
ymously, but to give it with our names
attached is to throw our reputation in
the face of their opponents and also in
the mud. Once, an important beverage
company operating in India asked me 
to calculate the Indian elasticity of de-
mand for canned sodas. It clearly hoped
to argue that the elasticity was so high
that a reduction in the sales tax on them
would raise more, not less, revenue (à la
the Laffer curve). This request surprised
me–since I am an economist who works
with ideas and never crunches numbers
–until I realized that they had to know
that I was a close friend of the ½nance
minister (now the prime minister). So 
I replied mischievously: I am afraid I
cannot do this until the ½nance minister
changes. Naturally, I never heard from
them again.
Economists are also tempted today by
large fees that accrue when they testify
in court on behalf of corporate clients.
Lawyers do this all the time, though out-
standing jurists abstain from such prac-
tice. Once, I was giving a keynote speech
at Yale Law School, when a lawyer teased
me with the old chestnut, that where
there are six economists there are six
opinions (though Keynes had said seven
opinions, two being his own). I teased
him back from the lectern: That is bad,
but with lawyers the situation is worse.
Each lawyer has six opinions if he has six
clients.
But even when a scrupulous economist
avoids these pitfalls, substantive prob-
lems still arise in pursuing the public in-
terest. These come from two different
directions.
If we are to pursue the public interest
by arguing that one policy is preferable
over another (say, freer trade over re-
treat into further protectionism), we
need to be able to analyze persuasive-
ly how the different policies will work.
Then, we must have a criterion by which
we choose among these policies, in light
of this analysis. Economists call the ½rst
‘positive’ analysis, and the second ‘nor-
mative’ analysis. If either is defective,
the economist’s ability to say that a spe-
ci½c policy advances the public interest
is compromised.
In truth, even the positive analysis
leads often to irreconcilable differences,
not just between economists and others
but among economists themselves, vex-
ing politicians who would prefer clearer
guidance. Prime Minister Robert Peel,
who abolished England’s Corn Laws in
1846 and introduced free trade to the
world for the ½rst time, was clearly con-
verted to free trade by the writings of
economists starting with Adam Smith,
though the celebrated Chicago econo-
mist George Stigler has written unper-
suasively that “economists exert a mi-
nor and scarcely detectable influence 
on the societies in which they live . . . . 
If Cobden [who led the anti-Corn Law
movement] had spoken only a little Yid-
dish, and with a stammer, and Peel had
been a narrow, stupid man, England
would have moved toward free trade in
grain as its agricultural classes declined
and its manufacturing and commercial
classes grew.”2
2  George Stigler, The Economist as Preacher and
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But Peel also famously lamented the
fact that he often found conflicting anal-
ysis of the central questions in what was
then called ‘political economy.’ Thus he
argued in the Parliament:
Far be it for me to depreciate that noble
science which is conversant with the laws
that regulate the production of wealth and
seeks to make human industry most con-
ducive to human comfort and enjoyment.
. . . I ½nd the dif½culties [faced by us in ac-
cepting their less-than-compelling analy-
sis] greatly increased by the conflict of
authorities . . . . The very heads of Colonel
Torrens’s chapters are enough to ½ll with
dismay the bewildered inquirer after
truth. These are literally these: ‘Erroneous
views of Adam Smith respecting the value
of Corn’ . . . ‘Errors of Mr. Ricardo and his
followers on the subject of rents,’ ‘Error 
of Mr. Malthus respecting the nature of
rent,’ ‘Refutation of the doctrines of Mr.
Malthus respecting the wages of labour.’3
Little has changed since then. At the
heart of the problem is the fact that not
all economists share the same model. A
model, whether explicit or implicit, pro-
vides the map of how a policy will work.
Thus different schools plague macroeco-
nomics: monetarist (Milton Friedman),
Keynesian, rational expectations (Rob-
ert Lucas), and varying versions of each.
But even if we were to agree on a model
to look at the world, we can and will dis-
agree on the parameters that feed into
the model. 
So we can take it for granted that 
some economists will dissent even in
cases where there is substantial consen-
sus, such as whether free trade is a bet-
ter policy than protectionism. There is,
however, socially useful dissent, and
then there is socially unproductive dis-
sent. The case for free trade, and its his-
torical evolution since the time Adam
Smith wrote of its virtue over two cen-
turies ago, illustrates this distinction
well.
Take ½rst the useful dissent. Since
Adam Smith, prominent economists
have disputed the merits of free trade.
The reason was simple. Put heuristical-
ly, the case for free trade depends on 
our faith in the ability of market prices
to reflect social costs. When there are
market failures, an empirical issue, the
Invisible Hand (which depends on mar-
ket prices being socially correct guides 
to ef½cient allocation of resources) could
be pointing in the wrong direction. Dur-
ing the period of massive unemploy-
ment after the Great Crash of 1929, (the
positive) market wages did not represent
the true social cost of labor (which was
zero), and Keynes became a famous ad-
vocate for protection. 
In modern times, since World War II,
economists have analyzed imperfections
in the labor and other ‘factor’ markets;
and my students Paul Krugman and
Gene Grossman have likewise examined
imperfections in the product markets.4
However, in 1963, I restored the case
for free trade by arguing that all we
needed to do was apply an appropriate
policy to remove the market failure. 
For example, if producers in an indus-
3  Quoted in Douglas Irwin, “Political Economy
and Peel’s Repeal of the Corn Laws,” Economics
& Politics 1 (1) (Spring 1989). Adam Smith was
the dominant ½gure in the new science of polit-
ical economy (Economics); but David Ricardo
enjoys a nearly equal reputation, and Malthus
and Torrens were also major writers, active in
the debates of their time.
4  In several publications during the last decade,
I have reviewed and systematized the repeated
episodes over two centuries of theoretical de-
partures from the case for free trade for differ-
ent types of market failures. The easiest to ac-
cess is Free Trade Today (Princeton, N.J.: Prince-
ton University Press, 2002), based on lectures at
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try were polluting without having to pay
for the pollution, then their social cost
would exceed their private cost. Society
would be overproducing in that indus-
try, and free trade might well be harm-
ful relative to protection. But if we in-
troduced a ‘polluter pay’ tax, we could
remove the market failure and go back
to free trade. This simple insight trans-
formed the postwar theory of commer-
cial policy, restoring to free trade its pre-
eminence and widespread support in the
profession.
The few dissenters to free trade today
are unlike earlier dissenters. They fall
into the category of unproductive dis-
senters. I suspect that their activities 
are a response to the perverse incentives
that characterize economic dissent.
Unlike the political dissenters (such as
Vaclav Havel) who typically lived under
grueling conditions, today’s economic
dissenters flourish. The sheer dearth of
these dissenters raises their value im-
mensely. The foundations that fund the
current pandemic of conferences want
the ‘opposing’ point of view represent-
ed. So these dissenters are going to Oslo,
Tokyo, Port Alegre, Paris, and other ex-
otic places to attend seminars and con-
ferences where they are welcome sim-
ply because economists who espouse
their viewpoints are scarce. They also
½nd themselves addressing adoring
crowds, such as at the World Social Fo-
rum, where passion outweighs intellec-
tual competence in these areas. And if
one is a Nobel Laureate, the incentive 
to behave as an economic dissenter is
greater still: after all, if one has the No-
bel Prize, why worry about what one’s
peers think?5 Instead, one can cultivate
a new ‘market,’ a populist audience, and
aspire to join the ranks of Naomi Klein
and Arundhati Roy, whose conclusions 
are more obvious than their arguments.
These few dissenters are a nuisance, di-
verting economists into ½ghting rubbish
within their own ranks. Yet they present
no real threat to the ability of the profes-
sion to advance the public interest.
Then again, the aging population, and
the speed with which science changes,
creates intergenerational differences in
analysis, as the older scholars ½nd their
modes of analysis being replaced by new
ones. Several scholars age gracelessly.
When Paul Samuelson was asked how
often science changed, he replied, “With
every funeral.” But even when they do
accept the new gracefully, differences 
in perception, from the use of ‘older’
models, carry over into different views
of the ‘positive’ issues at hand. In the re-
cent debate on globalization, some have
argued that as economies such as India’s
and China’s grow more like us in their
endowments (i.e., develop scientists, en-
gineers, and doctors), the gains from our
specialization in skill-intensive products
will decline. But we now know, from
theoretical work on ‘trade in variety’ or
‘trade in similar products,’ that special-
ization takes place within industries. 
So as countries grow similar in endow-
ments, trade in similar products breaks
out: one can observe this by walking
down Madison Avenue and observing
the many men’s fashion designers, such
as Giorgio Armani, Christian Dior, Ken-
5  It is reassuring that few Noble Laureates be-
have like this. The danger with a Nobel Lau-
reate dispensing errors is particularly great
when it comes to developing countries. These 
countries typically tend to be ascriptive and
also do not have the local expertise to chal-
lenge erroneous pronouncements and advice.
By contrast, in the developed countries, there
is a lot of expertise and debate, and there are
many Nobel Laureates and also other distin-
guished scholars, who can counter nonsense
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zo, Calvin Klein, and Pierre Cardin, 
compete and coexist in the same fash-
ion industry while offering the custom-
ers much gain. Both my student Robert
Feenstra, who is the leading econome-
trician of trade today and heads the
nber Program on International Trade,
and my colleague David Weinstein have
estimated these gains from similar prod-
ucts and concluded that they are huge.
Once we admit into our thinking a new
‘model,’ our view of reality changes: 
in this instance, toward a more benign
view of globalization.
In normative analysis, the economics
profession runs into dif½culties as gen-
uine as the ones that afflict it in positive
analysis. Contrary to what public-poli-
cy debates might suggest, economists 
do try to answer the question of how to
judge whether a policy is ‘better’ than
another. Suf½ce it here to indicate some
of the ways in which they have grappled
with the issue.
Perhaps the most important observa-
tion I can make is to indicate how in a
multiperson economy one can call a 
policy better than another. If Robinson
Crusoe were to put Man Friday on a
boat, leaving us to judge his one-person
welfare as total welfare, life would be
simple. But as soon as you have two (or
more) people in a society, how do we
determine if a policy change improves
welfare if one person’s welfare increases
but another’s declines? 
The typical criterion that economists
have settled upon is the Pareto criterion:
if the policy change improves Robinson
Crusoe’s welfare but decreases Man Fri-
day’s, the policy change increases overall
welfare if Robinson Crusoe can compen-
sate Man Friday and still have enough
gravy left over to make himself better
off. This sounds great until you realize,
as my famous Oxford teacher Ian Little
noted in his pathbreaking work, that this
is only a ‘possibility’ criterion: if Man
Friday is left in reality with his reduced
welfare, few would agree that the wel-
fare of Robinson Crusoe’s island society
actually improved.
Economists, with increasing sophis-
tication culminating in work such as
Samuelson’s, have shown that free trade
is a Pareto-better policy. But suppose, 
as we liberalize trade, that the rich get
richer and the poor get poorer, and no
actual compensation takes place. Should
we call Freer Trade a better policy than
increased Protection? If we cannot com-
pensate the losers, then many would re-
ject this conclusion.
So, if positive analysis leads one to ar-
gue that trade with poor countries and
other forms of economic globalization,
such as multinational investment out-
flow to these countries and inflow of un-
skilled immigrants from them, is causing
the poor to get poorer in the rich coun-
tries (Marx’s prediction of the immiser-
ation of the proletariat did not material-
ize in the nineteenth and most of twen-
tieth centuries but may now be striking
again with the aid of globalization), and
if one thinks that actual compensation
to the losers is not feasible because of
the decline of the welfare state, then that
person would reject freer trade. This
may well describe the state of thinking
on free trade in the United States today.
But this is as good as the positive anal-
ysis of the effects of trade (and immigra-
tion and multinational investments). As
I have argued in many places,6 the asser-
tion by the afl-cio, and the New Dem-
6  E.g., chapter 10 of my book, In Defense of Glo-
balization (New York: Oxford University Press,
2004); the afterword in the new edition issued
in August 2007, which offers more analysis of
the issues; and several recent Financial Times
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ocrats they support and capture, that
globalization is placing the economic
pressure on the wages of the unskilled
and even the middle class is not tenable.
Their policy prescription against free
trade, though justi½ed by a normative
criterion that many of us share as citi-
zens and economists, is vitiated by erro-
neous analysis, and thus handicaps, not
advances, the public good. 
Indeed, there are many other instances
in the public-policy domain today where
bad analysis married to good normative
criteria has created counterproductive
results, setting the public interest back
instead of advancing it. The renowned
philosopher, Peter Singer, wrote a book
against globalization, which marries his
utilitarian analysis with large amounts 
of antiglobalization nonsense, marring
an otherwise interesting book.7 He also
recently wrote a New York Times Maga-
zine article on foreign aid, which argued
that there was a moral case for more 
foreign aid but betrayed absolutely no
awareness of the enormous analytical,
empirical, and econometric literature,
both recent and from the 1960s through
1980s, on why aid could be unproduc-
tive and, more important, counterpro-
ductive.8 If aid results in less, not more,
development, how can one say that aid 
is good for the recipients? Or that we
should give aid, as Singer proposes?
Furthermore, economists must re-
spond to intergenerational income-dis-
tribution problems in addition to Rob-
inson Crusoe versus Man Friday prob-
lems. A typical question we grapple with
is: what is the ‘optimal’ rate of saving?
Now with environmental concerns at
the forefront, we must also wonder:
what do we owe to future generations?
These are income-distribution questions
over time, not just within a given society. 
There are questions of income distri-
bution over space as well. Immigration
is one example. How do we evaluate a
freer immigration policy versus a restric-
tionist one in situations where the im-
migrants gain but their outmigration
harms those left behind (as with some
poor countries suffering from ‘brain
drain’)? Should immigrants’ welfare be
aggregated with that of the countries
receiving them or with that of the coun-
tries losing them, or with both, or with
neither? The sophisticated discussion 
of these issues is to be found in econo-
mists’ writings from time to time; but it
is virtually lost in the din of heated de-
bates over immigration.
Economists are aware that in discuss-
ing public good, they must also allow 
for what another of my Oxford teachers,
Roy Harrod, called ‘process utilitarian-
ism.’ Often, economists (who are gen-
erally utilitarians) will consider a poli-
cy to be better because it augments ef-
½ciency and therefore the availability 
of goods and services. But one might
object to the process (e.g., markets) by
which we arrive at that ef½cient solu-
tion. As Richard Posner once argued, 
especially “Technology, Not Globalization, is
Driving Wages Down,” January 4, 2007. 
7  His book, One World: The Ethics of Globali-
zation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 2002), was reviewed jointly with my
book, Free Trade Today (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2002) in The 
New York Review of Books, March 25, 2004.
8  See Peter Singer, “What Should a Billionaire
Give–and What Should You?” New York Times
Magazine, December 17, 2004. The large liter-
ature on how aid may have a malign impact,
and might even be given with malign intent, 
is ignored by the proponents of a substantial 
surge in aid like my colleague Jeffrey Sachs;
but that is neither persuasive to scholarly
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tribute babies ef½ciently, but most of 
us would ½nd such a market distasteful.
Or should we allow rich people to park
in spaces for the handicapped just by
buying special permits to do so: should
not everyone have to assume the obliga-
tion to keep these spaces off-limits to the
nonhandicapped? Or should Al Gore be
allowed to buy offsets (i.e., ½nance co2-
emission reductions) from others when
he emits a lot of carbon in his home? It
is ½ne if Al Gore wants to ½nance co2-
emission reductions, but it should not 
be used to justify a lifestyle where he as-
sumes no responsibility to cut down his
own emissions. 
These issues are very much what we
economists deal with as we discuss the
public good. Our analysis, and our ap-
preciation of the nuances involved, is
much richer than what many critics,
who are not familiar with the ways of
sophisticated economists and go by
what they learned in 101 classes from
indifferently written textbooks, assume
to be the case. Familiarity breeds con-
tempt, but contempt does not breed fa-
miliarity.
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